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Abstract—Polar lattices, which are constructed from polar
codes, are provably good for the additive white Gaussian noise
(AWGN) channel. In this work, we propose a new polar lattice
construction that achieves the secrecy capacity under the strong
secrecy criterion over the mod-Λ Gaussian wiretap channel. This
construction leads to an AWGN-good lattice and a secrecy-good
lattice simultaneously. The design methodology is mainly based
on the equivalence in terms of polarization between the Λ/Λ′
channel in lattice coding and the equivalent channel derived from
the chain rule of mutual information in multilevel coding.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner [1] introduced the wiretap channel and showed that
both reliability to transmission errors and a prescribed degree
of data confidentiality could be attained by channel coding
without any key bits if the channel between the sender and
the eavesdropper (wiretap channel CW ) is a degraded version
of the channel between the sender and the legitimate receiver
(main channel CV ). The goal is to design a coding scheme that
makes it possible to communicate both reliably and securely,
as the block length of transmitted codewordN tends to infinity.
Reliability is measured by the decoding error probability of
the legitimate user, namely limN→∞ Pr{Mˆ 6= M} = 0,
where M is the confidential message and Mˆ is its estimation.
Secrecy is measured by the mutual information between M
and the signal received by the eavesdropper ZN . Currently
the widely accepted strong secrecy condition was proposed
by Csisza´r [2]: limN→∞ I(M ;ZN) = 0. In simple terms, the
secrecy capacity is the maximum achievable rate of any coding
scheme that can satisfy both the reliability and strong secrecy
conditions.
Polar codes [3] have been shown their great potential
of solving this wiretap coding problem. The polar coding
scheme proposed in [4] is proved to achieve the strong secrecy
capacity with explicit construction when CV and CW are
both binary-input memoryless channels, although it is not
able to guarantee the reliability condition. A subsequently
modified scheme [5] fixes this issue and finally satisfies the
two conditions. However, for continuous channels such as the
Gaussian wiretap channel, the problem of achieving strong
secrecy with a practical code is still open.
There has been some progress in wiretap lattice coding
for the Gaussian wiretap channel. On the theoretical aspect,
the achievable rate for lattice coding achieving weak secrecy
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Fig. 1. The mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel.
over the Gaussian wiretap channel has been derived [6].
Furthermore, the existence of lattice codes approaching the
secrecy capacity under the strong secrecy criterion (semantic
security) was demonstrated in [7]. On the practical aspect,
wiretap lattice codes were proposed in [8] to maximize the
eavesdropper’s decoding error probability. Since the analysis
of the mod-Λ Gaussian channel is a key element to the analysis
of Gaussian channels and it provides considerable insight
into the construction for the Gaussian wiretap channel, we
limit ourselves to the mod-Λ Gaussian wiretap channel shown
in Fig. 1. The lattice coset coding scheme for the mod-Λs
Gaussian wiretap channel was introduced in [7]. M is encoded
into an N -dimensional transmitted codeword XN . The outputs
Y N and ZN at Bob and Eve’s end respectively are given by{
Y N = [XN +WNb ] mod Λs,
ZN = [XN +WNe ] mod Λs,
where WNb and WNe are N -dimensional Gaussian vectors with
zero mean and variance σ2b , σ2e respectively. The channel input
XN satisfies the power constraint
1
N
E
[
‖ XN ‖2
]
≤ P.
To satisfy this power constraint, we choose a shaping lattice Λs
whose second moment per dimension is P . Under the contin-
uous approximation for large constellations, the transmission
power will be equal P .
Assume that Λs, Λe and Λb are quantization-good [9],
secrecy-good and AWGN-good respectively (the latter two will
be defined in Sect. II). Let Λs ⊂ Λe ⊂ Λb be a nested chain of
N -dimensional lattices in RN such that 1N log |Λb/Λe| = R.
Consider a one-to-one mapping: M → [Λb/Λe] which asso-
ciates each message to a coset leader λm ∈ Λb/Λe. Alice
selects a random lattice point λ ∈ Λe ∩ V(Λs) (V(Λ) is
the Voronoi region of Λ defined in Sect. II) and transmits
XN = λ+λm. This coding scheme can achieve both reliability
and strong secrecy. Although the existence of secrecy-good
lattices has been proved, their explicit construction is still
missing.
Polar lattices, which can be considered as the counterpart of
polar codes in the Euclidean space, is a promising candidate
for the Gaussian wiretap channel. They have already been
proved to be AWGN-good [10], which means the reliability
condition can be satisfied and we just need to take the strong
secrecy into account. Motivated by [4], we propose an explicit
polar lattice construction which can be proved to achieve both
the strong secrecy and reliability over the mod-Λs channel.
Conceptually this new polar lattice can be regarded as an
AWGN-good lattice Λb nested within a secrecy-good lattice
Λe. The design philosophy is mainly based on the equivalence
between two well-known channels which greatly simplifies
the construction for secrecy-good lattices. We note that the
mod-Λ front-end simplifies the problem under study in this
paper. The coding system with a shaping method to achieve
the secrecy capacity of the genuine Gaussian wiretap channel
will be addressed in the journal paper.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the
background of lattices. The relationship between two types of
channels is investigated in Section III. In Section IV, by using
the equivalence proved in the previous section, we propose
our new polar lattice coding scheme and prove its secrecy and
reliability. Some remarks are given in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND ON LATTICES
A. Definitions
A lattice is a discrete subgroup of Rn which can be
described by
Λ = {λ = Bx : x ∈ Zn},
where the columns of the generator matrix B = [b1, · · · ,bn]
are linearly independent.
For a vector x ∈ Rn, the nearest-neighbor quantizer asso-
ciated with Λ is QΛ(x) = argminλ∈Λ ‖ λ − x ‖. We define
the modulo lattice operation by x mod Λ , x−QΛ(x). The
Voronoi region of Λ, defined by V(Λ) = {x : QΛ(x) = 0},
specifies the nearest-neighbor decoding region. The Voronoi
cell is one example of fundamental region of the lattice. A
measurable set R(Λ) ⊂ Rn is a fundamental region of the
lattice Λ if ∪λ∈Λ(R(Λ) + λ) = Rn and if (R(Λ) + λ) ∩
(R(Λ)+λ′) has measure 0 for any λ 6= λ′ in Λ. The volume
of a fundamental region is equal to that of the Voronoi region
V(Λ), which is given by V (Λ) =| det(B) |.
For σ > 0, we define the noise distribution of the AWGN
channel with zero mean and variance σ2 as
fσ(n) =
1
(
√
2πσ)n
e−
‖n‖2
2σ2 ,
for all n ∈ Rn. Given σ, the volume-to-noise ratio (VNR) of
an n-dimension lattice Λ is defined by
γΛ(σ) ,
V (Λ)
2
n
σ2
.
We also need the Λ-periodic function
fσ,Λ(n) =
∑
λ∈Λ
fσ,λ(n) =
1
(
√
2πσ)n
∑
λ∈Λ
e−
‖n−λ‖2
2σ2 ,
for all n ∈ Rn.
We note that fσ,Λ(n) is a probability density function (PDF)
if n is restricted to the the fundamental region R(Λ). This
distribution for n ∈ R(Λ) is actually the PDF of the Λ-
aliased Gaussian noise, i.e., the Gaussian noise after the mod-
Λ operation [11]. When σ is small, the effect of aliasing
becomes insignificant and the Λ-aliased Gaussian density
fσ,Λ(n) approaches the Gaussian distribution. When σ is large,
fσ,Λ(n) approaches the uniform distribution.
In this paper, we mainly deal with the following two kinds
of lattices.
Definition 1 (AWGN-good): A lattice Λb is called AWGN-
good if it is capable of achieving the Poltyrev capacity [12]
with a fast-vanishing error probability as long as its VNR is
larger than 2πe.
Definition 2 (Secrecy-good): A lattice Λe which results in
fast-vanishing information leakage I(M ;ZN ) is regarded as
a secrecy-good lattice.
Note that this definition is different from that in [7], which
is based on the flatness factor.
B. Mod-Λ and Λ/Λ′ Channel
A sublattice Λ′ ⊂ Λ induces a partition (denoted by Λ/Λ′)
of Λ into equivalence groups modulo Λ′. The order of the
partition is denoted by |Λ/Λ′|, which is equal to the number
of the cosets. If |Λ/Λ′| = 2, we call this a binary partition.
Let Λ1/ · · · /Λr−1/Λr for r ≥ 2 be an n-dimensional lattice
partition chain. If only one level is applied (r = 2), the
construction is known as “Construction A”. If multiple levels
are used, the construction is known as “Construction D” [13,
p.232]. For each partition Λℓ/Λℓ+1 (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ r − 1) a code
Cℓ over Λℓ/Λℓ+1 selects a sequence of coset representatives
aℓ in a set Aℓ of representatives for the cosets of Λℓ+1.
A lattice constructed by the binary partition chain is referred
as the binary lattice. This construction requires a set of nested
linear binary codes. The set of nested linear binary codes Cℓ
with block length N and dimension of information bits kℓ are
represented as [N, kℓ] for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ r − 1 and C1 ⊆ C2 · ·· ⊆
Cr−1. Let ψ be the natural embedding of FN2 into ZN , where
F2 is the binary field. Let b1,b2, · · · ,bN be a basis of FN2
such that b1, · · ·bkℓ span Cℓ. When n = 1, the binary lattice
L consists of all vectors of the form
r−1∑
ℓ=1
2ℓ−1
kℓ∑
j=1
α
(ℓ)
j ψ(bj) + 2
r−1
l, (1)
where α(ℓ)j ∈ {0, 1} and l ∈ ZN .
A mod-Λ channel is a Gaussian channel with a modulo-Λ
operator in the front end [11], [14]. The capacity of the mod-Λ
channel is [11]
C(Λ, σ2) = logV (Λ)− h(Λ, σ2), (2)
where h(Λ, σ2) is the differential entropy of the Λ-aliased
noise over V(Λ):
h(Λ, σ2) = −
∫
V(Λ)
fσ,Λ(n) log fσ,Λ(n)dn.
The differential entropy is maximized to logV (Λ) by the
uniform distribution over V(Λ). It is known that the Λ/Λ′
channel (i.e., the mod-Λ′ channel whose input is drawn from
Λ ∩ V(Λ′)) is regular, and the optimum input distribution is
uniform [11]. Furthermore, the Λ/Λ′ channel is a binary-inputs
memoryless symmetric channel (BMS) if |Λ/Λ′| = 2 [10]. The
capacity of the Λ/Λ′ channel for Gaussian noise of variance
σ2 is given by [11]
C(Λ/Λ′, σ2) = C(Λ′, σ2)− C(Λ, σ2)
= h(Λ, σ2)− h(Λ′, σ2) + log(V (Λ′)/V (Λ)).
III. EQUIVALENT CHANNELS
We use a binary lattice partition chain Λ1/Λ2/ · · · Λr to
construct lattices so that we can use binary codes at each
level. Here Λs is for shaping and we assume Λs ⊂ ΛNr .
Eve can do the mod-Λr operation to remove all the random
bits λ. With some overloading of notation, we also write
ZN = (XN + WNe ) mod ΛNr . It is known that ZN is a
sufficient statistic for (XN + WNe ) mod Λs [11]. In other
words, the mod-Λr operation is information-lossless in the
sense that I(XN ;ZN) = I(XN ; (XN +WNe ) mod Λs). As
far as mutual information is concerned, we can use the mod-Λr
operator instead of the mod-Λs operator here. We also assume
the inputs to the binary encodes C1, · · ·, Cr−1 are uniformly
distributed and independently between each other. Therefore
the signal points XN = (XN1 , · · ·, XNr−1) ∈ ΛN1 /ΛNr have
equal a priori probabilities where XNi is the output of the i-th
binary encoder. And we note that all the lattice partitions are
regular. The Λi/Λi+1 channel corresponding to the variance
σ2 is denoted by W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2). The conditional PDF of
this channel is fσ,Λi+1(z − xi) [11].
By the chain rule of mutual information,
I(Z;X) = I(Z;X1, X2, · · ·, Xr−1)
= I(Z;X1) + I(Z;X2|X1) + · · ·
+ I(Z;Xr−1|X1, · · ·, Xr−2).
(3)
Transmitting vectors x with binary digits xi, i = 1, · · ·r− 1
over the mod-Λr channel can be separated into the parallel
transmission of individual digits xi over r − 1 equivalent
channels, provided that x1, ···, xi−1 are known [15]. We inves-
tigate these equivalent channels, denoted by W ′(Z;Xi|X1, · ·
·, Xi−1), in the framework of lattice codes.
From [11], the conditional PDF of z is fZ(z|x) = fσ,Λr(z−
x), z ∈ V(Λr). Then based on the chain rule (3) and equivalent
channels [15, (5)], the conditional PDF of the first equivalent
channel with the input x1 is
fZ(z|x1) = 1Pr(Λ2/Λr + x1)
∑
x∈Λ2/Λr+x1
Pr(x)fZ(z|x)
(1)
=
1
|Λ2/Λr + x1|
∑
x∈Λ2/Λr+x1
fσ,Λr(z − x)
(2)
=
1
|Λ2/Λr + x1|
∑
x∈Λ2/Λr+x1
fσ,Λ2(z − x)
(3)
=
1
|Λ2/Λr|
∑
x∈Λ2/Λr+x1
fσ,Λ2(z − x), z ∈ V(Λr),
where (1) is due to the uniform assumption, (2) is because
Λ2/Λr + x1 represents the mod-Λ2 operation plus a shift
x1 inside V(Λr), (3) is due to the fact that |Λ2/Λr + 0| =
|Λ2/Λr + 1| and fσ,Λ2(z) z ∈ V(Λ2) is the conditional PDF
of the mod-Λ2 channel. We note that fZ(z|x1) is Λ2-periodic.
We note that this is the same result as [11, Lemma 6].
Remark 1: If the inputs are uniformly distributed,
W ′(Z;Xi|X1, · · ·, Xi−1) can also be proved to be a BMS
channel in the same way that the channel W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2) is
proved to be a BMS channel in [10].
The conditional differential entropy h(Z|X1) is [11]
h(Z|X1) = −
∫
V(Λr)
fZ(z|x1) · log fZ(z|x1)dz
= log |Λ2/Λr|+ h(Λ2, σ2).
By [11, Lemma 6], with the uniform inputs, the differential
entropy h(Z) = log |Λ1/Λr|+h(Λ1, σ2). Therefore the mutual
information of the first equivalent channel is
I(Z;X1) = h(Z)− h(Z|X1)
= h(Λ1, σ
2)− h(Λ2, σ2) + log |Λ1/Λ2|,
which is equal to the mutual information of the Λ1/Λ2 channel
I(W (Λ1/Λ2, σ
2)).
One can verify that the mutual information of the i-th
equivalent channel I(Z;Xi|X1, · · ·, Xi−1) is equal to the
mutual information of the Λi/Λi+1 channel in the same
fashion.
This result motivates a stronger statement, namely the polar
codes constructed from that these two channels are the same.
To see this, it suffices to show that the mutual information
and Bhattacharyya parameters of the resultant bit-channels
which are polarized from W (Λ1/Λ2, σ2) and W ′(Z;X1) are
the same. Let Q(z|x) be a BMS channel with binary input
alphabet X ∈ {0, 1} and output alphabet Z ∈ R. Consider a
random vector U2 that is uniformly distributed over X 2. Let
X2 = U2 · [ 1 01 1 ] be the input to two independent copies of the
channel Q and let Z2 be the corresponding outputs. After the
channel combining and splitting, the resultant bit-channels [3]
are defined as
Q
(1)
2 (z
2|u1) = 1
2
∑
u2
Q(z1|u1 ⊕ u2)Q(z2|u2),
Q
(2)
2 (z
2, u2|u1) = 1
2
Q(z1|u1 ⊕ u2)Q(z2|u2).
Then we apply this polarization transformation to
W (Λ1/Λ2, σ
2) and W ′(Z;X1), respectively. After some
mathematic manipulations, we get
W
(1)
2 (z
2|0) = 1
2
(fσ,Λ2(z1)fσ,Λ2(z2)
+ fσ,Λ2(z1 − 1)fσ,Λ2(z2 − 1)),
W
(1)
2 (z
2|1) = 1
2
(fσ,Λ2(z1 − 1)fσ,Λ2(z2)
+ fσ,Λ2(z1)fσ,Λ2(z2 − 1)),
and
W
′(1)
2 (z
2|0) =
1
2|Λ2/Λr|2
( ∑
x∈Λ2/Λr
fσ,Λ2(z1 − x)fσ,Λ2(z2 − x)
+
∑
x∈Λ2/Λr
fσ,Λ2(z1 − x− 1)fσ,Λ2(z2 − x− 1)
)
,
W
′(1)
2 (z
2|1) =
1
2|Λ2/Λr|2
( ∑
x∈Λ2/Λr
fσ,Λ2(z1 − x− 1)fσ,Λ2(z2 − x)
+
∑
x∈Λ2/Λr
fσ,Λ2(z1 − x)fσ,Λ2(z2 − x− 1)
)
.
By the definitions of the mutual information and the Bhat-
tacharyya parameter of a BMS channel [3]{
I(Q) ,
∫ ∑
x
1
2Q(y|x) log Q(y|x)1
2
Q(y|0)+ 1
2
Q(y|1)
dy
Z(Q) ,
∫ √
Q(y|0)Q(y|1)dy ,
we have{
I(W
(1)
2 (z
2|x1)) = I(W ′(1)2 ((z2|x1)))
Z(W
(1)
2 (z
2|x1)) = Z(W ′(1)2 (z2|x1)))
.
And it is not difficult to verify that{
I(W
(1)
2 (z
2, x2|x1)) = I(W ′(1)2 ((z2, x2|x1)))
Z(W
(1)
2 (z
2, x2|x1)) = Z(W ′(1)2 (z2, x2|x1)))
.
Since the construction of polar codes are based on either
the mutual information or the Bhattacharyya parameter of the
bit-channels, polar codes constructed for W (Λ1/Λ2, σ2) and
W ′(Z;X1) are the same. The validation of the equivalence be-
tween the i-th channel W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2) and W ′(Z;Xi|X1, · ·
·, Xi−1) is similar.
We summarize the foregoing analysis in the following
lemma:
Lemma 1: Consider a lattice L constructed by a binary
lattice partition chain Λ1/ · · · /Λr. Constructing a polar code
for the i-th equivalent binary-input channel W ′(Z;Xi|X1, · ·
·, Xi−1) defined by the right hand side of (3) is equivalent to
constructing a polar code for the channel W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2).
Remark 2: This lemma also holds for the AWGN channel
(without the mod-Λ front-end). The construction of polar
lattices for the AWGN channel are explicitly explained in
[10], where nested polar codes are constructed based on a
set of W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2) channels. We note that the channel
W (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2) is degraded with respect to the channel
W (Λi+1/Λi+2, σ
2).
Remark 3: One can expect the equivalence in a more
general sense than the construction of polar codes. The proof
may be based on the equivalence between coset decoding [9]
and maximum likelihood (ML) decoding of the fine lattice Λi
in the presence of the Λi+1-aliased Gaussian noise.
IV. ACHIEVING STRONG SECRECY AND RELIABILITY
In this section, we demonstrate the polar lattice constructed
from a set of nested polar codes can achieve strong secrecy
for the mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel. The construction of
component polar codes follows the idea in [4]. We still use the
notations in [5] to restate their construction. Define the sets of
very reliable and very unreliable indices for a channel Q and
0 < β < 0.5:
G(Q) = {i : Z(Q(i)N ) ≤ 2−N
β},
N (Q) = {i : I(Q(i)N ) ≤ 2−N
β}.
(4)
The following are immediate results of [16] and [17, Lemma
4.7]:
lim
N→∞
|G(Q)|/N = C(Q),
lim
N→∞
|N (Q)|/N = 1− C(Q),
and since W is degraded with respect to V ,
lim
N→∞
|G(V ) ∩ N (W )|/N = C(V )− C(W ),
lim
N→∞
|G(V )c ∩ N (W )c|/N = 0. (5)
The indices in G(V ) and N (W ) are the reliable and the secure
indices. The index set can be partitioned into the following
four sets:
A = G(V ) ∩ N (W )
B = G(V ) ∩ N (W )c
C = G(V )c ∩ N (W )
D = G(V )c ∩ N (W )c.
Unlike the standard polar coding, the bit-channels are parti-
tioned into three parts: A set M that carries the confidential
message bits, a set R that carries random bits, and a set F
of frozen bits which are known to both Bob and Eve prior to
transmission. It is shown that limN→∞ I(M ;ZN) = 0 if we
assign the bits as follows:
A =M
B ⊆ R
C ⊆ F
D ⊆ R.
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Fig. 2. The multilevel lattice coding system over the mod- Gaussian wiretap channel.
A. Gaussian Wiretap Coding Scheme
Now it is ready to introduce the new polar lattice for
the mod- Gaussian wiretap channel shown in Fig. 2. A
polar lattice is constructed by a set of nested polar codes
N, k N, k ⊆ · · · ⊆ N, k and a binary
lattice partition chain ··· . The block length of polar
codes is . Alice splits the message into · · ·,M
We follow (6) to assign bits in the component polar codes
to achieve strong secrecy. Define (Λ +1, σ and
(Λ +1, σ and is degraded with respect to
for . Then we can get and for
. Similarly, we assign the bits as follows
⊆ R
⊆ F
⊆ R
(7)
for . Since and is degraded with respect
to +1 and +1 , it is easy to obtain that ⊇ C +1 which
means ∪B ∪D ⊆ A +1 ∪B +1 ∪D +1. This construction
is clearly a lattice construction as polar codes constructed on
each level are nested. We skip the proof of nested polar codes
here. A similar proof can be found in [10].
Interestingly, this polar lattice construction generates an
AWGN-good lattice and a secrecy-good lattice si-
multaneously. is constructed from a set of nested polar
codes N, |A |B |D ⊆ · · · ⊆ N, |A
|B |D and the lattice partition chain · · ·
while is constructed from a set of nested polar codes
N, |B |D ⊆ ··· ⊆ N, |B |D and the
same lattice partition chain · · · . More details about the
AWGN-goodness of are given in Sect. IV-C. It is clear that
. Our coding scheme is equivalent to the coset coding
scheme we introduced in Sect. I, which maps the confidential
message to the coset leaders ∩ V(Λ
B. Strong Secrecy and Secrecy Rate
By using the above assignments and [4, Proposition 16], we
have
where mod +1. In other words, the employed
polar code for the channel (Λ +1, σ can guarantee
that the mutual information between the input message and
the output is upper bounded by . From Lemma 1,
this polar code can also guarantee the same upper bound on
the mutual information between the input message and the
output of the channel · · ·, X as shown in
the following inequality:
,M · · ·,M
Recall is the signal received by Eve after mod- . From
the chain rule of mutual information,
(8)
=1
· · ·,M
=1
· · ·,M ,M · · ·,M
=1
,M · · ·,M
=1
,M · · ·,M
rN
Therefore strong secrecy is achieved as lim →∞ ) =
Now we present the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 1: Consider a polar lattice constructed accord-
ing to (7) with the binary lattice partition chain · · ·
Fig. 2. The ultilevel lattice coding syste over the od-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel.
A. Gaussian iretap Coding Scheme
Now it is ready to introduce the new polar lattice for
the mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel shown in Fig. 2. A
polar lattice L is constructed by a set of nested polar codes
C1(N, k1) ⊆ C2(N, k2) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Cr−1(N, kr−1) and a binary
lattice partition chain Λ1/Λ2/···/Λr. The block length of polar
codes is N . Alice splits the message M into M1, · · ·,Mr−1.
We follow (6) to assign bits in the component polar codes
to achieve strong secrecy. Define Vi = W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2b ) and
Wi = W (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
e) and Wi is degraded with respect to
Vi for 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1. Then we can get Ai, Bi, Ci and Di for
1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1. Similarly, we assign the bits as follows
Ai =Mi
Bi ⊆ R
Ci ⊆ F
Di ⊆ R
(7)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ r− 1. Since Wi(and Vi) is degraded with respect
to Wi+1(and Vi+1), it is easy to obtain that Ci ⊇ Ci+1 which
means Ai ∪Bi ∪Di ⊆ Ai+1 ∪Bi+1 ∪Di+1. This construction
is clearly a lattice construction as polar codes constructed on
each level are nested. We skip the proof of nested polar codes
here. A similar proof can be found in [10].
Interestingly, this polar lattice construction generates an
AWGN-good lattice Λb and a secrecy-good lattice Λe si-
multaneously. Λb is constructed from a set of nested polar
codes C1(N, |A1|+ |B1|+ |D1|) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Cr−1(N, |Ar−1|+
|Br−1|+ |Dr−1|) and the lattice partition chain Λ1/ · · · /Λr,
while Λe is constructed from a set of nested polar codes
C1(N, |B1|+ |D1|) ⊆ ··· ⊆ Cr−1(N, |Br−1|+ |Dr−1|) and the
same lattice partition chain Λ1/ · · ·/Λr. More details about the
AWGN-goodness of Λb are given in Sect. IV-C. It is clear that
Λe ⊂ Λb. Our coding scheme is equivalent to the coset coding
scheme we introduced in Sect. I, which maps the confidential
message M to the coset leaders λm ∈ Λb/Λe.
B. Strong Secrecy and Secrecy Rate
By using the above assignments and [4, Proposition 16], we
have
I(Mi;Z
N
i ) ≤ N2−N
β
,
where ZNi = ZN mod Λi+1. In other words, the employed
polar code for the channel W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2e) can guarantee
that the mutual information between the input message and
the output is upper bounded by N2−Nβ . From Lemma 1,
this polar code can also guarantee the same upper bound on
the mutual information between the input message and the
output of the channel W ′(Z;Xi|X1, · · ·, Xi−1) as shown in
the following inequality:
I(Mi;Z
N ,M1, · · ·,Mi−1) ≤ N2−Nβ .
Recall ZN is the signal received by Eve after mod-Λr. From
the chain rule of mutual information,
I(ZN ;M) (8)
=
r−1∑
i=1
I(ZN ;Mi|M1, · · ·,Mr−1)
=
r−1∑
i=1
h(Mi|M1, · · ·,Mr−1)− h(Mi|ZN ,M1, · · ·,Mr−1)
=
r−1∑
i=1
h(Mi)− h(Mi|ZN ,M1, · · ·,Mr−1)
=
r−1∑
i=1
I(Mi;Z
N ,M1, · · ·,Mi−1)
≤ rN2−Nβ .
Therefore strong secrecy is achieved as limN→∞ I(M ;ZN) =
0.
Now we present the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 1: Consider a polar lattice L constructed accord-
ing to (7) with the binary lattice partition chain Λ1/ · · · /Λr
and r− 1 binary nested polar codes with block length N . By
scaling Λ1 and r to satisfy the following conditions:
(i) h(Λ1, σ2b )→ logV (Λ1)
(ii) h(Λr, σ2e)→ 12 log(2πeσ2e),
given σ2e > σ2b , as N → ∞, all strong secrecy rates R
satisfying
R <
1
2
log
σ2e
σ2b
are achievable using the polar lattice L on the mod-Λs
Gaussian wiretap channel.
Proof: By (5) and (7),
lim
N→∞
R =
r−1∑
i=1
lim
N→∞
|Ai|
N
=
r−1∑
i=1
C(Vi)− C(Wi)
=
r−1∑
i=1
C(W (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
b ))− C(W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2e))
= C(W (Λ1/Λr, σ
2
b ))− C(W (Λ1/Λr, σ2e))
= C(Λr, σ
2
b )− C(Λ1, σ2b )− C(Λr, σ2e) + C(Λ1, σ2e)
= h(Λr, σ
2
e)− h(Λr, σ2b ) + h(Λ1, σ2b )− h(Λ1, σ2e)
=
1
2
log
σ2e
σ2b
− (ǫe − ǫb)− ǫ1,
where

ǫ1 = h(Λ1, σ
2
e)− h(Λ1, σ2b ) ≥ 0,
ǫb = h(σ
2
b )− h(Λr, σ2b ) = 12 log(2πeσ2b )− h(Λr, σ2b ) ≥ 0,
ǫe = h(σ
2
e)− h(Λr, σ2e) = 12 log(2πeσ2e)− h(Λr, σ2e) ≥ 0
and ǫe − ǫb ≥ 0.
ǫ1 can be made arbitrarily small by scaling Λ1 such
that both h(Λ1, σ2e) and h(Λ1, σ2b ) are sufficiently close to
logV (Λ1). In polar lattices for AWGN-goodness [10], we
assume h(Λr′ , σ
2
b ) ≈ 12 log(2πeσ2b ) for some r′ < r. Since
ǫb < ǫe, Λr′ is not enough for the wiretap channel. We need to
increase the number of levels until h(Λr, σ2e) ≈ 12 log(2πeσ2e)
such that both ǫb and ǫe are almost 0. Therefore by scaling
Λ1 and adjusting r, the secrecy rate can get arbitrarily close
to 12 log
σ2e
σ2
b
.
Remark 4: We note that these are just mild conditions.
When the σ2e = 4 and σ2b = 1, the gap from 12 log
σ2e
σ2
b
is only
0.05 when we choose r = 3 and partition chain α(Z/2Z/4Z)
with scaling factor α = 2.5.
Remark 5: 12 log
σ2e
σ2
b
is an upper bound on the secrecy
capacity of the mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel since it
equals to the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel
as the signal power goes to infinity. Latices codes can not
be better than this. It is noteworthy that we successfully
remove the 12 -nat gap in the achievable secrecy rate derived
in [7] which is caused by the limitation of the L∞ distance
associated with the flatness factor.
Remark 6: The two conditions (i) and (ii) are the design
criteria of secrecy-good lattices. The construction for secrecy-
good lattices requires more levels than the construction of
AWGN-good lattices.
C. Reliability
Here how to assign D is a problem. Assigning freezing bits
to D guarantees the reliability but achieves the weak secrecy,
whereas assigning random bits to D guarantees the strong
secrecy but may violate the reliability requirement because D
may be nonempty. In the original work on using polar codes
to achieve the secrecy capacity for symmetric and binary-input
wiretap channels [4], in order to ensure strong security, D is
assigned with random bits (D ∈ R), which results in the fact
that this scheme failed to accomplish the theoretical reliability.
More explicitly, for any i-th level channel W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2b ) at
Bob’s end, the probability of error is upper bounded by the
sum of the Bhattacharyya parameters Z(W (j)N (Λi/Λi+1, σ2b ))
of those bit-channels that are not frozen to zero. For each
bit-channel index j and β < 0.5, we have
j ∈ A ∪R = G(W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2b ), β) ∪ D.
By the definition (4), we can see that the sum of
Z(W
(j)
N (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
b )) over the set G(W (Λi/Λi+1, σ2b ) is
bounded by 2−Nβ , and therefore, the error probability of the
i-th level channel under the successive cancellation (SC) de-
coding, denoted by PSCe (Λi/Λi+1, σ2b ), can be upper bounded
by
PSCe (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
b ) ≤ 2−N
β
+
∑
j∈D
Z(W
(j)
N (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
b )).
Since multistage decoding is utilized, by the union bound, the
final decoding error probability for Bob is bounded as
Pr{Mˆ 6= M} ≤
r−1∑
i=1
PSCe (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
b ).
Unfortunately, a proof that this scheme satisfies the reliability
condition cannot be arrived here because the bound of the
sum
∑
j∈D Z(W
(j)
N (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
b )) is not known. Note that
significantly low probabilities of error can still be achieved in
practice since the size of D is very small.
It is also worthy mentioning that this reliability problem
was recently solved in [5], where a new scheme dividing the
information message of each Λi/Λi+1 channel into several
blocks is proposed. For a specific block, D is still assigned
with random bits and transmitted in advance in the set A of
the previous block. This scheme involves negligible rate loss
and finally realizes reliability and strong security simultane-
ously. In this case, if the reliability of each partition channel
can be achieved, i.e., for any i-th level partition Λi/Λi+1,
PSCe (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
b ) vanishes as N goes to infinity. Then the
total decoding error probability for Bob can be made arbitrarily
small. Actually, based on the new scheme of assigning the
problematic bits in D [5], the error probability on level i can
be upper bounded by
PSCe (Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
b ) ≤ ǫiN ′ + ki · o(2−N
′β
), (9)
where ki is the number of information blocks on the i-th level,
N ′ is the length of each block which satisfies N ′ × ki = N
and ǫiN is caused by the first separate block on the i-th level
consisting of the initial bits in Di. Since |Di| is extremely
small comparing to the block length N , the decoding failure
probability for the first block can be made arbitrarily small
when N is sufficiently large. Therefore, Λb is an AWGN-good
lattice.
Note that the rate loss incurred by repeatedly transmitted
bits in Di is negligible because of its small size and the fact
that only one block is wasted on each level. Explicitly, the
actually achieved secrecy rate in the i-th level is given by
ki
ki+1
[C(Λi/Λi+1, σ
2
b ) − C(Λi/Λi+1, σ2e)]. Clearly, this rate
can be made close to the maximum secrecy rate by choosing
sufficiently large ki as well.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this work, we showed that the new polar lattice can
achieve both strong secrecy and reliability over the mod-Λs
Gaussian wiretap channel. The uniform assumption was used
to construct AWGN-good lattice Λb and the secrecy-good
lattice Λe. Since the confidential message is mapped to the
coset leaders of Λb/Λe, the channel between the confidential
message and the Eavesdropper can be seen as a Λb/Λe
channel. Since the Λb/Λe channel is symmetric, the maximum
mutual information is achieved by the uniform input. Conse-
quently, the mutual information corresponding to other input
distributions can also be upper bounded by rN2−Nβ in (8).
Therefore, strong secrecy under other distributions can also be
proved, which means our scheme actually achieves semantical
security in cryptographic terms [7], [18]. The rigorous proof
will be given in the journal paper. A similar statement for the
binary symmetric channel can be found in [18, Theorem 4.12].
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